In the course of his attack on the discipline of bioethics Professor Swales attempts to establish two conclusions. First, he argues that medical ethics cannot be dissociated from clinical decisions and should not, therefore, be taught as a separate subject in the medical curriculum. Medical ethics is 'too important', he says, to have its own separate place in the curriculum. Given this ringing affirmation of the importance of ethics for clinical practice, one would reasonably expect Swales's second conclusion to be that we must now proceed to develop a clinically-based medical ethic -ie an approach that would combine the conceptual sophistication of contemporary ethical theory with an appreciation of the empirical details of clinical practice. It comes as something of a surprise, then, when Swales's attack on the alleged separatism of bioethics turns into an attack on the very possibility of applying ethics to medicine. Since ethics in the world according to Swales is generally regarded as nothing more than sectarian, non-scientific speculation, he concludes that bioethics cannot be fruitfully applied to the moral dilemmas that beset contemporary medical practice. Lest today's physician be left without a moral compass of any sort, however, Swales hastens to add that a hard-headed, pragmatic utilitarianism -seasoned by years of medical experience -can serve as a guide to the perplexed physician. This endorsement of an instrumentalist ethical theory meshes nicely with Swales's conviction that all ethical questions in medicine are ultimately reducible to questions of technical expertise.
Although Professor Swales's unfavourable portrait of medical ethics bears scant resemblance to the discipline of bioethics as we know it, his dichotomous distinction between the 'two cultures' of medicine and ethics is sufficiently widespread in the medical community to merit a reply. Swales's indictment of contemporary ethics founders on a misunderstanding of the nature of ethics, of the interrelation of ethical and scientific considerations in clinical judgment, and of the role of the medical ethicist in the clinical setting.
The nature of ethics First we should simply say that the opposition portrayed between medicine and medical ethics as parallel to that between science and religious ethics amounts to a caricature of both the latter enterprises. Science is not merely an inductive ingathering of empirical facts, but an immensely more complex and more interesting affair, bristling with idiosyncratic hypotheses and other 'subjective' elements. Many eminent philosopher-historians of science have argued that all of our theories necessarily presuppose a certain prescientific parti pris -a certain way of viewing the world -and have consequently ruled out the very possibility of any clear 'direct observation' of nature un-mediated by the tinted 'lenses' of our competing theories (i This contention is vulnerable even if we assume the validity of an exclusively pragmatic or patientbenefiting ethic in the Hippocratic tradition. Such an ethic, ifit is to be anything more than a mere diagnostic and treatment manual, must be geared to the total welfare of the patient -not simply to her medical condition narrowly construed, but also to her emotional, psychological, and socioeconomic conditions as well. Thus, in deciding, for example, whether or not to tell a cancer patient the truth, the doctor must know about the patient's own hopes, fears, plans and problems in order accurately to predict what course will, in fact, maximise her welfare. This sympathetic identification and weighing of needs, preferences, and (sometimes) idiosyncratic values is no doubt a much more difficult undertaking than Swales would have us believe; but even more importantly, such a task is plainly not a matter of medical or technical expertise. Doctors have no special training to do it; and they are often pretty bad at it -(not, we hasten to add, because they are unusually insensitive to psychosocial considerations, but rather because of their own predisposition to treat patients in certain ways and because of the increasingly anonymous character of doctorpatient interactions in large hospitals and nursing homes today). A knowledge of the technical options is obviously necessaty to make informed decisions, but it is not sufftcient to calculate the patient's best interests. To do that, one would have to factor in all sorts ofhazy, non-scientific variables such as the patient's attitude toward cosmetic appearance, aversion to risk, etc.
Apart from these problems which are internal to Swales's pragmatic medical ethic, there are good reasons for rejecting any medical ethic that is blind to such themes as patients' rights, self-determination, truthtelling, and confidentiality. Even if most doctors were to develop the necessary counselling skills to work up an accurate and complete psychological profile of each patient, upon which they could base their judgment of 'best interests', we would still think that the patient retains the right to decide for herself what should be done by others (including doctors) to her body. We would say that she exercises this right because of her moral status as an autonomous, selfdetermining person. Thus, even if the welfare of a patient would seem to require a blood transfusion, the patient retains the moral and legal right to refuse such a procedure. Thus, Swales's bald assertion that 'the welfare of the patient is paramount' would have to be complemented by an equally sensitive concern for patients' rights.
In fact, anyone familiar with the development of contemporary biomedical ethics would realise that this cluster of rights emanating from the notion ofpatients' self-determination has provided the basis for an expressly covenantal or contractual patient-centred medical ethics that has produced rather impressive results in the last decade. Contrary to Swales's claim that contemporary bioethics has not had any noticeable effect on medical practice -a claim based on an embarrassingly faulty analogy between ethics and the philosophy of science -the impact of bioethics on issues of private and public health policy has been significant and far-reaching at least in the USA. Although bench scientists may not have changed their behaviour to suit the theories of Hempel, Kuhn and Popper, At the opposite extreme from the moraliser is the 'analyser' -a person whose expertise consists in identifying the values implicated by various choices, charting the implications of these choices for other values that people might hold, and assessing the logical coherence of the arguments offered on behalf of ethical choices. Whereas the moraliser wastes no time in rushing to a moral judgment, the analyser self-consciously refrains from making any moral judgments, resting content to clarify the moral issues and expose fallacious reasoning. Repelled by the notion that his job is to tell other people how to behave morally, the analyser would most likely disown the title of 'moral expert'.
While we know of no one doing medical ethics seriously who subscribes to the moraliser prototype, many do believe in some version of the analyser. We hold neither view to be adequate. Each contains elements of a more complete medical ethic, but neither can stand alone. The ethicist as moraliser is a parody of serious work in medical ethics; the ethicist as analyser places unnecessary limits on the kinds ofwork that need to be done. Let us illustrate with a case.
Recently one of us encountered a comatose middleaged woman in an intensive care unit whose best hope, however slender, was to emerge severely braindamaged, having lost both legs, an arm, and the remaining hand. Although some discussion had taken place regarding the continuation of the massive efforts required merely to stabilise her debilitated condition, no one was willing to take responsibility for talking with the family about the possibility of discontinuing the aggressive treatments she was currently receiving.
The problem facing the house staff and the nurses was what to do about the patient's surgeon. During the course of the unsuccessful operation the surgeon had apparently made a forgiveable error, setting off a cascade of unfortunate medical complications, and had subsequently withdrawn both from the woman's family and from the other medical staff involved in the case. As a result, the agonising task of communicating with the family fell to the nurses and house staff.
A responsible ethicist could make confident moral judgments about certain features ofthis case, but about other things he might only be able to engage in a dialogue with the family and staff, helping them all to muddle through. A clinical ethicist should have no trouble concluding, for example, that the family must be brought into a dialogue regarding this patient's future course of treatment (or non-treatment). Appropriate family members should be forthrightly (but sensitively) appraised of the patient's dire condition, dismal prognosis, future quality of life, and the remaining medical options. Assuming that they wish to decide and that they will base their decision on the patient's best interest, the family should be allowed to determine whether 'aggressive' treatments should be employed further to prolong the patient's life. The 'moraliser' model permits the bioethicist to pass moral judgments when there is a clear understanding that some important standard of ethical conduct has been violated. In this case, the surgeon's behaviour placed an unfair burden on the other medical staff, and added to the terrible burden borne by the patient's family. What happened in this case, was that the patient's family indicated, when finally approached, that they would be willing to care for her no matter what her con-i26 John D Arras and Thomas H Murray dition, so long as she could rejoin them at home. A tragic choice, but one which must be sensitively attuned to the values ofthe woman and her family, and based on the best medical knowledge available.
A case of another woman with similarly bleak prospects was further complicated by the intransigent stance taken by one of the first-year surgical residents involved in the woman', care. This young physician was scandalised by the prospect of allowing his patient to die. 'I think we must keep her alive', he asserted, 'that's what the medical profession is all about. That's what I've been trained to do'. The resident went on to argue that a decision to withdraw 'aggressive' therapy from the patient would be tantamount to killing her. Here; we would argue, is an ideal occasion for the ethicist-as-analyser to make an appearance. Either during the case consultation itself or (more likely) in subsequent teaching rounds, the ethicist can aid clinical decision-making through a sophisticated, yet clear, analysis of the conceptual and moral differences between 'killing' and 'letting die' in various circumstances. We think it highly desirable that this sort of reflective analysis replace the mere repetition of slogans -'Saving life is our job' -especially when the unreflective parroting of such maxims can lead to increased pain and suffering for patients and their families.
Thus, we prefer to think of the medical ethicist as a person skilled in moral reasoning and schooled in the medical and psychological realities of the clinic, whose primary function is to engage all concerned in serious and clear reflection upon the moral dimensions of their work. Sometimes this task will require the ethicist emphatically to remind a physician that adult patients of sound mind have a right to determine what shall be done to their bodies; at other times it will require the application of analytical skills to conceptual and normative problems. But beyond these two functions of the 'moralist' and the 'analyser', we see a third role for the ethicist in the hospital: as a diagnostician of the 'deep structure' of ethical dilemmas. Just as a good physician might attempt to relate reported symptoms to an underlying biochemical cause, a perceptive ethicist should be alert to the possible institutional causes of the ethical dilemmas that present themselves in the medical context. Rather than resting content with a model of the ethicist as a 'moral engineer' (6) -ie, as someone who applies the tools of ethical analysis to problems precisely as they are presented by the medical staff -we believe that the ethicist should view the staff's presentation of a dilemma as one bit of information fitting into a larger picture. Often enough, the particular form in which a problem is presented will either badly misconstrue the actual problem or tend to obscure the underlying organisational reasons for the dilemma's appearance. Take, for example, the problem of triage within a medical ICU. The dilemma of 'whom to save when not all can be saved' is certainly one of the most difficult and persistent ethical problems faced by hospital-based ethicists; yet, as they grapple with the 'tragic choice' of who ought to get the last bed in the ICU, ethicists should also ask themselves why this bed happens to be the last one. Is it because the hospital administration has allocated insufficient resources to its ICU? Or is it the last bed because the medical director of the ICU exercises insufficient control over who gets in and who goes out? Perhaps the ethicist will discover that the problem of chronic overcrowding -and thus the dilemma posed by triagecould be alleviated by a more enlightened policy of giving only 'supportive' care to those patients who are truly beyond the pale of aggressive measures.
One of us has spent a good deal of time with a particular hospital intensive care unit. Its director had requested our help in dealing with some thorny ethical dilemmas which, he said, were a source of continuing divisiveness among nurses and physicians. We found that, although the staff was indeed confronted by perplexing ethical problems, the source of dissension had more to do with the manner in which physicians (including inexperienced house staff) related to the nurses, who often knew much more about appropriate treatments than the neophyte doctors. In this case, an 'ethical engineer' would have accepted the diagnosis as presented by the director and thus would have overlooked the real source of dispute. Although we agreed to analyse the ethical dilemmas themselves, we also insisted upon discussing the organisational and personal problems that served to exacerbate the staffs difficulties in resolving the ethical disputes.
Conclusion
As long as medical decisions are about human beings and the kinds of lives they will lead -or leave -those decisions will be inextricable mixtures of medical, scientific and moral considerations. In most cases, no great ethical dilemmas emerge, and both doctor and patient can get on with their affairs without the aid of a bioethicist. But when those dilemmas do arise, or when common medical practices rest on dubious moral grounds, it is handy to have a bioethicist around. Not to make the decisions, certainly, but to improve the dialogue, to help doctors to appreciate the moral complexities of their vocation, and, in the tradition of one ofthe first 'ethicists', to be the horsefly biting the rump of the Athenian (or Hippocratic) steed when needed. 
